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LIABILITY TO EMPLOYEES OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
ENGAGED IN INHERENTLY DANGEROUS WORK: A WORKABLE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROPOSAL
INTRODUCTION

Employers of independent contractors' are generally not liable to third
parties for the negligent acts committed by those contractors. 2 The courts,
however, recognizing the inequity of a rule that allows the person who is to
benefit from certain work to escape liability for risks created by the per-3
formance of that work, have developed various exceptions to its application.
1. "An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do something for
him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect
to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking." Restatement (Second) of Agency §
2(3) (1958). He is to be contrasted with a servant, who is also employed to do something, but
"whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to
control by the master." Id. § 2(2). The following factors, among others, are to be considered in
determining whether one acting for another is an independent contractor or a servant: "(a) the
extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work,
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of
occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the
direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill required in the
particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities.
tools, and the place of work ... ; (f) the length of time for which the person is employed; (g) the
method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is a part of
the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the
relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in business." Id, § 220(2).
2. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409 (1965); W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts §
71, at 468 (4th ed. 1971); see Harold A. Newman Co. v. Nero. 31 Cal. App. 3d 490. 496, 107
Cal. Rptr. 464, 467 (1973); Blake v. Ferris, 5 N.Y. 48, 52 (1851). Horn v. State, 51 Misc. 2d 124,
129, 272 N.Y.S.2d 884, 889 (Ct. Cl. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 31 A.D.2d 364. 297 N-Y.S.2d
795 (3d Dep't 1969); Davis v. Cam-Wyman Lumber Co., 126 Tenn. 576, 583, 150 SW 545, 547
(1912). The general rule of employer immunity was not always universally accepted The earliest
case raising the question of the liability of an employer for the negligence of an independent
contractor was Bush v. Steinman, 126 Eng. Rep. 978 (1799), in which the employer was held
liable but the grounds for the decision were unclear. Id. at 979-81. That holding was later
repudiated and the present rule of employer nonliability was instituted in Laugher v Pointer, 108
Eng. Rep. 204 (1826) and Reedie v. London & N.W. Ry., 154 Eng. Rep. 1201 (1849).
3. The most widely recognized exceptions are set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§
410-429 (1965). The first broad category of exceptions deals with situations in which the employer
is guilty of his own negligence; for example, when the employer has explicitly directed the
independent contractor to act in a manner that causes an unreasonable risk of harm to persons to
whom the employer owes a duty to exercise care, Posner v. Paul's Trucking Serv, Inc , 380 F.2d
757, 760 (1st Cir. 1967); Collins v. Goodrich, 324 Mass. 251, 253, 85 N.E.2d 771, 773 (1949);
Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Consumers Co., 2 El. & BI. 767, 769-70, 118 Eng. Rep. 955. 956 (1853),
when the employer has negligently selected an incompetent contractor, Watsontown Brick Co v.
Hercules Powder Co., 265 F. Supp. 268, 271-72 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 387 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1967);
Golden v. Conway, 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 957, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69. 74 (1976); Corleto v- Shore
Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 307, 350 A.2d 534, 537 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975), and
when the employer negligently exercises any control he has retained over part of the work.
DeVille v. Shell Oil Co., 366 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir. 1966). The second category imposes liability
on the employer for the negligence of the independent contractor in failing to properly perform a
nondelegable duty owed by the employer. The nondelegable character of these duties is based on
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In 1876, the Queen's Bench Division in Bower v. Peate4 created the first
recognized exception, the inherently dangerous work doctrine. 5 The court explained that an employer who hires another to perform work "from which,
in the natural course of things, injurious consequences . . . must be expected
to arise, . . . is bound to see to the doing of that which is necessary to prevent

the mischief, and cannot relieve himself of his responsibility by employing
someone else." 6 Although the courts have often taken a "ragged and irrathe general idea that they are so important that the employer should not be permitted to shift
their performance to another. W. Prosser, supra note 2, § 71, at 470-71. These duties may be
imposed by statute, such as the duty of an architect to comply with building code provisions,
Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. Modular Age, Inc., 363 So. 2d 1152, 1155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Johnson v. Salem Title Co., 246 Or. 409, 413, 425 P.2d 519, 522 (1967) (en banc), the duty to
maintain in reasonably safe condition a sign hanging over a public way, Blount v. Tow Fong, 48
R.I. 453, 455, 138 A. 52, 53 (1927) (duty imposed by ordinance), or the duty to provide employees
with a reasonably safe place to work. Godulas v. New York City Transit Auth., 18 Misc. 2d 831,
840, 188 N.Y.S.2d 230, 240 (1959), rev'd on other grounds, 12 A.D.2d 61, 208 N.Y.S.2d 205
(1960), aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 871, 179 N.E.2d 507, 223 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1961). The nondelegable duty
may also be one arising at common law, such as the duty to keep premises reasonably safe for
business invitees, Whirlpool Corp. v. Morse, 222 F. Supp. 645, 653 (D. Minn. 1963), ff'd per
curiam, 332 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1964); Corrigan v. Elsinger, 81 Minn. 42, 47, 83 N.W. 492, 493
(1900); Lipman Wolfe & Co. v. Teeples & Thatcher, Inc., 268 Or. 578, 586-87, 522 P.2d 467,
470-71 (1974), or the duty to refrain from obstructing a public way. Campus v. McElligott, 122
Conn. 14, 18, 187 A 29, 31 (1936); Brown Hotel Co. v. Sizemore, 303 Ky. 431, 434-35, 197
S.W.2d 911, 913 (1946). A party may also assume a nondelegable duty by contract. Webb v. Old
Salem, Inc., 416 F.2d 223, 226 (4th Cir. 1969). The third category is referred to broadly as the
inherently dangerous work exception. See note 5 infra.
4. 1 Q.B.D. 321 (1876).
5. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 (1965) provides: "One who employs an independent
contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create during its progress
a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to
liability for physical harm caused to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable
care to take such precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions in the
contract or otherwise." Section 427 provides: "One who employs an independent contractor to do
work involving a special danger to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be
inherent in or normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when
making the contract, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to such others by the
contractor's failure to take reasonable precautions against such danger." Id. § 427. Although a
distinction is sometimes drawn between work requiring simple, obviously necessary precautions,
to which § 416 applies, and work requiring a comprehensive set of precautions, to which § 427
applies, the two statements of the rule are generally interchangeable. "Any work which is going to
be dangerous unless special precautions are taken can easily be regarded as inherently dangerous.
Any work which is inherently dangerous certainly is going to be dangerous unless certain
precautions are taken." 39 ALI Proceedings 249 (1963) [hereinafter cited as ALI Proceedings]
(statement of William Prosser). The long list of diverse activities that have been considered
inherently dangerous includes constructing a dam, Trump v. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co., 99 W. Va. 425, 429-30, 129 S.E. 309, 310 (1925), building a bridge over high voltage
wires, Walker v. Capistrano Saddle Club, 12 Cal. App. 3d 894, 901, 90 Cal. Rptr. 912, 915-16
(1970), piling steel beams in the street, Boylhart v. Dimarco & Reimann, Inc., 270 N.Y. 217, 221,
200 N.E. 793, 794 (1936), and excavating near a highway. Evans v. Elliott, 220 N.C. 253; 260-61,
17 S.E.2d 125, 130 (1941).
6. 1 Q.B.D. at 326.
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tional" approach 7 in delineating activities that are inherently dangerous,8 they

have not hesitated to apply the inherently dangerous work exception when
injured party is a member of the general public who bears no relation to
performance of the work. 9 When the injured party is an employee of
independent contractor, however, "conceptual difficulties" arise, 10 and

the
the
the
the

7. 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 26.11, at 1409 (1956); see Tropea v, Shell Oil
Co., 307 F.2d 757, 771-72 (2d Cir. 1962).
8. A review of the language used by the courts to describe the probability of injury required if
proper precautions have not been taken illustrates the variance in approaches to the rule. See
Philadelphia, B. & W. R.R. v. Mitchell, 107 Md. 600, 606-07, 69 A. 422, 424 (1908) (probable
consequence that "might [reasonably] have been anticipated"); Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice &
Supply Co., 320 Mo. 95, 113, 6 S.W.2d 617, 624 (1928) ("danger is likely to arise"); Richman
Bros. Co. v. Miller, 131 Ohio St. 424, 428-29, 3 N.E.2d 360, 362 (1936) ("'danger to others is
likely to attend the.., work' "); International Harvester Co. v. Sartain, 32 Tenn. App. 425, 456,
222 S.W.2d 854, 866 (1948) ("in the natural course of things mischievous consequences must be
expected to arise"); Trump v. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co., 99 W. Va. 425, 429,
129 S.E. 309, 311 (1925) ("might have been anticipated as a direct or probable consequence. . of
the work").
9. E.g., Rohlfs v. Weil, 271 N.Y. 444, 449, 3 N.E.2d 588, 589 (1936) (passerby injured),
Evans v. Elliott, 220 N.C. 253, 261, 17 S.E.2d 125, 130 (1941) (child playing adjacent to sewer
excavation injured); accord, Lindler v. District of Columbia, 502 F.2d 495, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(inherently dangerous doctrine "unequivocally applicable to third persons who are not employees
of a contractor"); Jones v. United States, 399 F.2d 936, 941 (2d Cir. 1968) (inherently dangerous
work exception not applied because plaintiff was an employee rather than a member of the
general public).
10. Olson v. Kilstofte & Vosejpka, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 583, 587 (D. Minn. 1971), aff'd per
curiam sub nom. Olson v. Red Wing Shoe Co., 456 F.2d 1299 (8th Cir. 1972). A situation
strikingly similar to that involving the inherently dangerous work exception is found in cases
ifivolving injuries to waterfront workers caused by the unseaworthiness of a vessel. See
Comment, Shipowner's Duties and Apportionment of Liability Under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 47 Fordham L. Rev. 323 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Shipowner's Duties]. Harbor workers are usually hired by independent contractors known as
stevedores, who provide longshoring services to shipowners. When a harbor worker is injured
during the course of his employment, he receives compensation from his direct employer, the
stevedore, who is thus immune from common law suit. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 904(a), 905(a) (1976). Shipowners, as third parties to the
employment relationship, are not immune from suit. In fact, the statute specifically permits the
longshoreman to maintain suit against them. Id. §§ 905(b), 933(a). Under admiralty law,
shipowners have an absolute, nondelegable duty to provide a seaworthy ship. Mahnich v.
Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 102 (1944). The class of persons to whom this duty is owed
includes longshoremen, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), and other harbor
workers exposed to unseaworthy conditions. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
The Supreme Court has held that based upon the implied "warranty of workmanlike service"
owed by the stevedore to the shipowner, stevedores may be required to idemnify shipowners for
damages recovered by longshoremen. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S.
124 (1956). The result is a "circular liability suit," whereby an injured longshoreman in effect
could recover full damages from his direct employer, the stevedore, who was supposedly immune
from common law suit under 33 U.S.C. § 905(a). The injured worker would recover from the
shipowner under the doctrine of unseaworthiness; the shipowner would then seek indemnity from
the stevedore under the warranty of workmanlike service, completing the circle and avoiding the
stevedore's statutory immunity. This frustrated the purpose of the statute and encouraged
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courts differ as to the applicability of this broad exception to the general rule
of employer nonliability. I
A review of the essential elements of a typical fact pattern will focus the
presentation of a proposed resolution of this issue. 12 Assume that an employer
hires an independent contractor to perform inherently dangerous work. While
the work is being completed, one of the independent contractor's employees is
injured because of the contractor's negligent failure to provide adequate
safeguards. The employer of the independent contractor has done everything
within his power to ensure the safety of the contractor's employees, and,
therefore, has not been personally negligent. 13 The question then becomes
unnecessary litigation, leading Congress to amend the statute in 1972. See Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251
(amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970)). The relevant new provision eliminates the longshoreman's strict liability action for unseaworthiness and relieves stevedores of the obligation to
indemnify shipowners for damages recovered by longshoremen. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976). The
shipowner's duty to longshoremen is now based on a negligence standard. Id. For a discussion of
this standard and its relation to land-based independent contractor rules, see Shipowner's Duties,
supra. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 (1965) has been said to contravene the express
statutory purpose of § 905(b) by imposing vicarious liability on the shipowner for the negligent
conduct of the stevedore. Brown v. Ivarans Rederi A/S, 5,15 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977).
11. Compare Vagle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 704 (1980) (inapplicable, therefore employer cannot be sued) and Welker v. Kennecott
Copper Co., 1 Ariz. App. 395, 403 P.2d 330 (1965) (same) and King v. Shelby Rural Elec. Coop.
Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974) (same) with Lindler v.
District of Columbia, 502 F.2d 495 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (applicable, therefore employer can be sued)
and Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68 Cal. 2d 245, 437 P.2d 508, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1968) (en banc)
(same) and Giarratano v. Weitz Co., 259 Iowa 1292, 147 N.W.2d 824 (1967) (same).
12. See, e.g., Vagle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 704 (1980) In Vagle, the plaintiff was an employee of a painting contractor that had
been hired to paint a bridge at the defendant employer's mining plant. Id. at 1216. Because the
bridge was located a few feet from an electrical transformer station, the plaintiff claimed lie was
involved in inherently dangerous work. Id. As the plaintiff and his partner were working, their
equipment came into contact with the "live" portion of the electrical substation. The electric
shock knocked both painters off their scaffold, causing them severe injuries. Id. The plaintiff
charged his direct employer, the independent contractor, with negligence in failing to provide
proper safeguards, and also claimed that the owner of the plant was negligent in failing to warn
the contractor's employees of the danger inherent in the work. Id. In addition, relying on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 416, 427 (1965), the plaintiff asserted that because the work was
inherently dangerous, the owner should be held vicariously liable for the negligence of the
independent contractor. Id. The court held that the owner of the plant, while liable for its own
negligence, could not be held vicariously liable to employees of an independent contractor for the
negligence of the independent contractor. Id. at 1219.
13. Most situations giving rise to a cause of action based on the "inherently dangerous" work
doctrine also give rise to a claim of negligence of the contractor's employer. E.g., Vagle v.
Pickands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212, 1219-20 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 704
(1980) (employer allegedly negligent in failing to warn independent contractor's employee of an
unavoidable, obvious danger on the premises); Epperly v. City of Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 777, 786,
399 P.2d 591, 597 (1965) (employer allegedly failed to fulfill common law duty to provide a
reasonably safe place to work). This Note is limited to the question of whether the inherently
dangerous work exception is sufficient to sustain a cause of action by the employee of the
independent contractor against the employer of the independent contractor.
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whether the employer may be held vicariously liable under the inherently
dangerous work doctrine for the negligent acts of the independent contractor.
Examination of this issue under strict common law tort principles may lead
to the conclusion that employees of independent contractors should be within
that class of persons protected by the inherently dangerous work exception. 4
To analyze any legal tenet only in terms of its history, however, is to do
injustice to the social goals underlying the very existence of the rule.' 5 Oliver
Wendell Holmes, arguing that logic cannot be the sole basis of sound legal
reasoning, stated that "a body of law is more rational and more civilized when
every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end which it
subserves.' 6 It is therefore necessary to examine a rule's development in light
of current social and economic goals to understand its effects on the ends that
it serves. 17 The existence today of some form of workers' compensation", in
every state is a prime example of how legislatures have radically altered the
common law in an effort to serve societal needs.' 9 It appears that a common
law rule purporting to establish liability for a work-related injury might
conflict with the purposes of workers' compensation statutes. Therefore,
such rules must be analyzed in relation to the statutes.
The approach of this Note reflects this analysis. First, the social and
economic ends to be served by the inherently dangerous work exception are
examined. The policy behind the exception is then compared to the policy
underlying workers' compensation statutes. This Note concludes that the
majority view-that employees of independent contractors are not protected
14. The early cases held that the independent contractor's employees stood on equal ground
with members of the general public for purposes of the inherently dangerous work doctrine. E.g.,
Chicago Economic Fuel Gas Co. v. Myers, 168 IIl. 139, 48 N.E. 66 (1897); Mallory v. Louisiana
Pure Ice & Supply Co., 320 Mo. 95, 6 S.W.2d 617 (1928) (en banc). More modern cases, deciding
the issue without addressing the effect of workers' compensation programs, have reached the
same conclusion. E.g., Van Arsdale v.Hollinger, 68 Cal. 2d 245, 437 P.2d 508, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20
(1968) (en banc); Giarratano v. Weitz Co., 259 Iowa 1292, 147 N.W 2d 824 (1967).
15. As one commentator has instructed, "We have to search for the mechanism of our law in
life as it actually is, rather than fit the life we live to a priori rules of rigid legal system." Laski,
The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 Yale L.J. 105. 113 (1916) (footnote omittedi; see Pound, The
Decadence of Equity, S Colum. L. Rev. 20 (1905); Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 591 (1911).
16. 0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers, 167, 186 (1920).
17. See W. Prosser, supra note 2, § 3. The judiciary has recognized that the application of the
common law must be continually scrutinized to assure that it supports the social and economic
needs of the time. E.g., Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 332-33, 521 P.2d 304, 307 (1974), Long
v. Landy, 35 N.J. 44, 50-51, 171 A.2d 1,4 (1961); see Larsen v. General Motors Corp-, 391 F.Zd
495, 506 (8th Cir. 1968) ("The common law is not sterile or rigid and serves the best interests of
society by adapting standards of conduct and responsibility that fairly meet the emerging and
developing needs of our time."); R. Pound, Interpretations of Legal History 1 (1923) ("Law must
be stable and yet it cannot stand still.").
18. See pt. Ill infra; Appendix infra. It is a basic premise of any workers' compensation act
that an employee who is injured in an accident arising "out of and in the course of employment"
may automatically recover benefits from his direct employer. 1 A- Larson, The Law of
Workmen's Compensation § 1.10, at 1 (1978).
19. Laski, supra note 15, at 126-30; see Smith, Sequel to Iorkmen's Compensation Acti, 27
Harv. L. Rev. 235, 238-39, 244-47 (1914).
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by the doctrine and therefore may not maintain a cause of action against the
employer-is legally just and socially expedient. Nevertheless, in the absence
of a concrete methodology, the goals of both the inherently dangerous work
exception and an adequate workers' compensation program cannot be fully
satisfied. This Note, therefore, also proposes such a methodology, to be
implemented through workers' compensation legislation and judicial interpretation, to facilitate the satisfaction of these goals.
I.

THE BASIS OF THE EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY

Despite the widespread acceptance of the validity of the inherently dangerous work exception, 20 courts have demonstrated an inability to identify
clearly work that is inherently dangerous. At one extreme, the activity need
not be extrahazardous-it need not fall into the class of work that would
cause injury even if performed with reasonable care-to be classified as
inherently dangerous. 2' Conversely, liability will not be imposed on the
employer if the work is only sufficiently dangerous that the exercise of
reasonable care would require the taking of precautions. 2 2 It is at least certain
that the injury must arise from a risk that is inherent in the work itself23
and
24
not from the "collateral negligence" of the independent contractor.
20. E.g., United States v. Babbs, 483 F.2d 308, 314 (9th Cir. 1973); Courtney v. Island Creek
Coal Co., 474 F.2d 468, 469-70 (6th Cir. 1973); Kuhne v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 649, 658
(E.D. Tenn. 1967); Bialkowicz v. Pan Am. Condo. No. 3, Inc., 215 So. 2d 767, 772 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1968); American Coated Fabrics Co. v. Berkshire Apparel Corp., 361 Mass. 165,
167-68, 279 N.E.2d 695, 696 (1972); McDonald v. Shell Oil Co., 20 N.Y.2d 160, 164-66, 228
N.E.2d 899, 901, 281 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1004-05 (1967); Lofy v. Joint School Dist. 2, 42 Wis. 2d
253, 262-63, 166 N.W.2d 809, 813 (1969).
21. 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 7, § 26.11, at 1408; see Tropea v. Shell Oil Co., 307
F.2d 757, 771 (2d Cir. 1962); Olson v. Kilstofte & Vosejpka, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 583, 587 (D.
Minn. 1971), affid per curiam sub nom. Olson v. Red Wing Shoe Co. 456 F.2d 1299 (8th Cir.
1972); Holman v. State, 53 Cal. App. 3d 317, 328, 124 Cal. Rptr. 773, 779-80 (1975); Norfolk &
W. Ry. v. Johnson, 207 Va. 980, 987, 154 S.E.2d 134, 139, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 995 (1967);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427, Comment b (1965).
22. 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 7, § 26.11, at 1408-09; see cases cited note 21 supra.
"The distinction to be made is between work which is of such character that, if properly done, no
injurious consequences can arise, and work which is of such character that injury to others is
likely unless precautionary measures are adopted." Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Johnson, 207 Va. 980,
987, 154 S.E.2d 134, 139, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 995 (1967); see Bower v. Peate, I Q.B.D. 321,
326 (1876).
23. Breece v. J. F Chapman & Son, Inc., 302 F.2d 581, 583-84 & n.1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 824 (1962); Holman v. State, 53 Cal. App. 3d 3t7, 328-30, 124 Cal. Rptr. 773, 779-81
(1975); see Cole v. City of Durham, 176 N.C. 289, 300, 97 S.E. 33, 38-39 (1918) ("If the work to
be done is dangerous only by reason of the absence of proper care in doing it, the doctrine as to an
independent contractor [maintaining the immunity of the employer] may apply; but If It is
dangerous in itself, and will continue to be so and probably cause injury, unless reasonable care is
taken to render it harmless to others [the rule of employer nonliability] does not apply.") The
work must involve "a risk, recognizable in advance, of physical harm to others which is Inherent
in the work itself, or normally to be expected in the ordinary course of the usual or prescribed
way of doing it, or that the employer has special reason to contemplate such a risk under the
particular circumstances under which the work is to be done." Restatement (Second) of Torts §
427, Comment b (1965).
24. Robbins v. Chicago, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 657, 679 (1866). The doctrine of "collateral
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Although some courts have treated the inherently dangerous work doctrine
as involving the employer's own negligence, 25 most courts and commentators
2 6
state that the doctrine is grounded in the concept of vicarious liability.

negligence" provides that the employer of an independent contractor performing inherently
dangerous work will be immune from suit if the contractor's negligence arises from the improper
manner in which the contractor performed the work rather than from the danger inherent in the
normal manner of performance of the work. Hodge v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1090, 1101
(M.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 424 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1970); American Coated Fabrics Co. v.
Berkshire Apparel Corp., 361 Mass. 165, 168, 279 N.E.2d 695, 696 (1972); Rodrigues v.
Elizabethtown Gas Co., 104 N.J. Super. 436, 444, 250 A.2d 408, 413 (Super. CL App. Div.
1969); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 426 (1965). See generally W. Prosser, supra note 2, § 71, at
474-75; Smith, Collateral Negligence, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 399 (1941).
25. E.g., McGarry v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 525, 564 (D. Nev. 1973) (applying Nevada
law) (court held that the employer's duty was nonvicarious and nondelegable but recognized that
a rule of vicarious liability might also exist); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Price, 170 So. 2d 293,
298 (Fla. 1964). Applying Florida law, the Fifth Circuit in Emelwon, Inc. v. United States, 391
F.2d 9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 841 (1968), stated: "The employer's liability is not
absolute, nor is he held vicariously liable for the negligence of the independent contractor. Rather
liability is imposed on the employer for his own failure to exercise reasonable care. . . . Should
injury occur under such circumstances of sufficiently great danger the employer is liable for the
breach of his own 'nondelegable duty' to take precautions against harm to third parties." Id. at 11
(emphasis added).
26. E.g., Vagle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212, 1217-18 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 704 (1980); United States v. DeCamp, 478 F.2d 1188, 1192-93 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973); Sloan v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 552 P.2d 157, 160-61 (Alaska 1976);
King v. Shelby Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659, 660-61 (Ky. 1973), cerl. denied, 417
U.S. 932 (1974); Mulcahy v. Argo Steel Constr. Co., 4 Mich. App. 116, 127, 144 N.W.2d 614,
619-20 (1966); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Julian, 425 Pa. 217, 219-20, 228 A.2d 669, 670-71 (1967).
Dean Prosser pointed out that the "nondelegable duty" cases impose liability on the employer for
the independent contractor's negligence even though the employer "has himself done everything
that could reasonably be required of him. They are thus cases of vicarious liability." W. Prosser,
supra note 2, § 71, at 470; accord, Communication and Study Relating to Liability of a Principal
for Negligent Injuries Inflicted by Independent Contractors, [19391 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n Rep.
409, 422 [hereinafter cited as 1939 Law Rev. Comm'n Rep.] ("the employer's liability is truly
vicarious'). For a detailed analysis of the difference between the employer being held vicariously
liable and being held liable for his own negligence when he has delegated the performance of
inherently dangerous work, see McGarry v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 525, 548-64 (D. Nev,
1973). The McGarry court concluded that both rules could coexist, but that in most cases the
liability based on the employer's own negligence would be superfluous and included within the
broader rule of vicarious liability. Id. at 564. As an example of a case in which the injured party
would seek to hold the employer liable for his own negligence, the, court cited suits brought
against the United States. Id. at 564. Under the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
2674, 2680 (1976), the United States cannot be held liable for imputed negligence. Laird v.
Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802-03 (1972) (United States not liable for injuries caused by government
engaging in ultra-hazardous activity because strict liability is imposed without regard to performance of a negligent act by any government employee); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,
44-45 (1953) (same). Thus, the plaintiff would be compelled to proceed under the nonvicarious,
nondelegable duty theory. McGarry v. United States, 370 F. Supp. at 564. Workers' compensation statutes provide another context in which this theory may be beneficial to plaintiffs. That
some courts have gone beyond the original statement of the rule, see note 6 supra and
accompanying text, and imposed liability on the employer even when he has "done everything
that could reasonably be required of him," W. Prosser, supra note 2, § 71, at 470, evinces the
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Because the theory of vicarious liability encompasses any situation in which
one person is held legally responsible for injuries caused solely by the fault of
another,27 common law principles dictating liability through fault are inapplicable. 25 Thus, some justification other than fault must underlie imputing
liability to the employer of an independent contractor.
The vicarious relationship imposed on the employer for the negligence of
his independent contractor under the inherently dangerous work doctrine has
been analogized to that imposed on a master for the torts of his servant acting
within the scope of his employment under the narrower doctrine of respondeat superior. 29 The development of the rule of respondeat superior can be
traced through medieval times, 30 during which the master had a "legal duty
trend toward enterprise liability and away from liability based on fault. See notes 47-50 itfra and
accompanying text.
27. 1939 Law Rev. Comm'n Rep., supra note 26, at 616; W. Prosser, supra note 2, § 69, at
458-59.
28. W. Prosser, supra note 2, § 69, at 458-59. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the tendency in tort law was to find that there could be no liability without fault. See
0. W. Holmes, The Common Law 144-63 (1881); Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability--Suggested
Changes in Classification, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 241, 319, 409 (1916). The concept of fault had little
to do with actual moral blame. Rather, it merely connoted a departure from the standard of
conduct required by society for its own protection. Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat
Superior", in Harvard Legal Essays 433, 442 (1934) ("[i]n fact, legal fault upon which liability is
based has little connection with personal morality or with justice to the individual; it is always
tinctured with a supposed expediency in shifting the loss from one harmed to one who has caused
the harm by acting below the standard imposed by the courts or legislators."). The concept of
fault was not the exclusive basis of liability in tort law. Examples of other bases of liability that
have developed are strict liability and respondeat superior. Smith, supra note 19, at 240; see
Harris, Liability Without Fault, 6 Tul. L. Rev. 337, 344-45 (1932); Isaacs, Fault and Liability,
31 Harv. L. Rev. 954, 960-61 (1918). Attacking the result of applying the doctrine of respondeat
superior, Justice Holmes argued: "[C]ommon-sense is opposed to making one man pay for another
man's wrong, unless he actually has brought the wrong to pass ...." Holmes, Agency, 5 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 14 (1891). Nevertheless, it has been recognized that the proper basis for vicarious liability
in the employer-employee situation is not the employer's fault or control over the employee, but is
rather the risk incident to the enterprise. 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 7, § 26.7, at
1376-77. The movement toward enterprise liability "has not openly repudiated the requirement of
fault, but has diluted it." Id. § 26.5, at 1372; see Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398
F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968) ("respondeat superior . . .rests not so much on policy grounds
consistent with the governing principles of tort law as in a deeply rooted sentiment that a business
enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be
characteristic of its activities."); Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 140 (Alaska 1972) (under
respondeat superior, the employer's "liability arises from the relationship of the enterprise to
society rather than from a misfeasance on the part of the employer").
29. See Holmes, Agency, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 345, 347 (1891); King v. Shelby Rural Elec. Coop.
Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Ky. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Epperly v. City of
Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 777, 783, 399 P.2d 591, 595 (1965).
30. Agreement has not been reached on the origins of the doctrine. Compare 0. W. Holmes,
supra note 28, at 7-8 (finding its roots in ancient Roman law) and Wigmore, Responsibility for
Tortious Acts: Its History (pts. I-I1), 7 Harv. L. Rev. 315, 383, 441 (1894) (tracing its origin to
ancient German law) with T. Baty, Vicarious Liability 1-34 (1916) (dating the doctrine to the late
seventeenth century and finding a lack of any significant ancient origin). The present formulation
of the doctrine can be traced to a series of cases decided by Lord Holt. See Hem v. Nichols, 90
Eng. Rep. 1154, 1154 (KB. 1709); Lane v. Cotton, 83 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1467 (K.B. 1701);
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to avoid certain kinds of acts which were obviously dangerous" 3to others, and
was liable for the performance of those acts by his servant. '
At first, the interpretation of respondeat superior was based on the maxim,
"he who does a thing by the agency of another, does it himself." 32 Thus, an
employer was held liable for harm caused by the acts of his servant when he
had either expressly or impliedly commanded the servant to act. 3 3 The courts
eventually abandoned their reliance on this command theory in favor of the
modern statement of the rule, under which the master is liable even absent a
showing of an implied command. 34 Instead, he is liable for all acts of his
servant arising out of the scope or course of the servant's employment. 35 The
applicability of respondeat superior is determined today by the master's
control over, or right to control, the person causing the injury. 36 Nevertheless, the viability of the concept of control as a justification for the doctrine of
respondeat superior has come under widespread attack in today's complex
work environment in an industrialized society. 37 Thus, although the control
theory is still recognized, it is used as a means for defining the scope of
liability rather than as a basis for imposing it. 38 Other theories advanced in
Middleton v. Fowler, 91 Eng. Rep. 247, 248 (K.B. 1699); Jones v Hart, 90 Eng. Rep 1255. 1255
(L-B. 1699); Turberville v. Stampe, 91 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1073 (K.B. 1697)
31. 3 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 385 (3d ed.. rewritten 1927)
32. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England § 579. at *429 (Jones ed 1916.
(footnote omitted).
33. Id. at *429-30.
34. Burger Chef Syss., Inc. v. Govro, 407 F.2d 921, 925 (8th Cir 1969); Gudgel v Southern
Shippers, Inc., 387 F.2d 723, 725-26 (7th Cir. 1967); 3 W. Holdsworth. supra note 31. at 383.
W. Prosser, supra note 2, § 69, at 459.
35. See, e.g., Lundberg v. State, 25 N.Y.2d 467, 255 N.E.2d 177. 306 N-Y S 2d 947 (19691,
Smalich v. Westfall, 440 Pa. 409, 269 A.2d 476 (1970); F. Harper & F. James. supra note 7, §
26.6; W. Prosser, supra note 2, § 70, at 460.
36. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) (1958); see, e.g., Drexel v Union Prescription
Centers, Inc., 582 F.2d 781, 785 (3d Cir. 1978) (right to control is " '[tlhe hallmark of an
employee-employer relationship' " (quoting Green v. Independent Oil Co , 414 Pa- 477, 483-84.
201 A.2d 207, 210 (1964))); Azad v. United States, 388 F.2d 74, 76 (8th Cir 1968) (right to control
is "an important if not the master test"); Newspapers, Inc. v. Love. 380 S.W 2d 582. 590 tTex
1964) (right to control is "the supreme test"); Mfassey v. Tube Art Display, Inc.. 15 Wash App.
782, 787, 551 P.2d 1387, 1390 (1976) (right to control is the "essential and oftentimes decisive
factor').
37. See, e.g., T. Baty, supra note 30, at 149; 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 7. § 2b 3.
Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. Chi. L. Rev, 501. 506-07 (1935) One
commentator has described the extension of obviously fictitious control to encompass the right of
control as "obvious rationalism" in our highly industrialized age. Id. at 507
38. See cases cited note 36 supra; 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 7, § 26 3. Steffen,
supra note 37, at 531 n.129. Professors Harper and James distinguished between using control as
a test to determine the master-servant relationship and treating it as a justification for vicarious
liability. 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 7. § 26.3, at 1366. They concluded that control is an
unwarranted justification based on an erroneous belief that the employer's fault is a prerequisite
to his liability. Id. The true basis was said to lie in the theory of enterprise liability Id- § 26-11.
at 1400; cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 221 (1909) ("whether [respondeat
superior) be grounded in considerations of policy or . . . historical tradition, there L a clear
limitation to its extent. The master's responsibility cannot be extended beyond the limits of [his
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support of the doctrine, such as the master's profit derived from the work and
39
the master's ability to choose his servants, have also been severely criticized.

The very survival of the rule of respondea.t superior in the face of harsh
criticism has been cited as suggestive of its true basis: its social and economic
underpinnings. 40 Thus, the justification for the rule is now found in a policy
based on "deliberate allocation of a risk."'4 1 Under this theory, the employer
assumes the risk of loss because he is in a better position than the employee to
absorb a loss by shifting it through insurance, 4 2 and then distributing it to the
community as a whole through an increase in prices or rates charged

consumers. 43 The cost of the injury is thus assessed to the entrepreneur as a
work. If the servant is doing his own work or that of some other, the master is not answerable for
his negligence in the performance of it." (citation omitted)).
39. Theories in addition to the "control" rationale that have been advanced in justification of
the rule of respondeat superior include profit, carefulness and choice, identification, evidence,
danger, and satisfaction. T. Baty, supra note 30, at 148. The first, profit, Is based on the
acknowledgment that the master receives the profit derived from his servant's undertaking. Id. at
147. This rationale fails to support fully respondeat superior because an individual may derive
profits from an undertaking and still not be liable for harm caused by the performance of the
work. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 Colum. L. Rev. 444, 4156 (1923) (citing as an example the rule
that a person is not rendered a partner in a business just because he shares in its profits). This
theory has also been criticized because it does not account for the "unlimited nature of the
[employer's] responsibility." T. Baty, supra note 30, at 147. Another theory is based on the care
with which the employer may choose his servants. This inadequately explains the result that the
employer will be held liable without regard to the degree of care exercised in selecting his
employees. Id.; Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an Employer of an Independent Contractor, 10 Ind. L.J. 494, 497 (1935). Baty describes the identification theory-the act of the servant is
the act of the master-as an "inane fiction." T. Baty, stpra note 30, at 147. Another possible
justification that has received little attention is that based on evidence, the theory being that it is
usually easier to identify whose servant caused a certain injury than it is to identify the employer
who directed the act. Id. Baty also reasoned that the justification based on the obligation of a
business to exercise reasonable care because of its dangerous nature does not adequately account
for the deference the courts have shown to business. Id. The rationale based on satisfaction of the
injured party, assuring that party access to a defendant who is able to pay, although accepted by
Baty, id. at 154, has been supplanted today by a justification based on efficient distribution of the
loss. 1939 Law Rev. Comm'n Rep., supra note 26, at 626.
40. Laski, supra note 15, at 111; see 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 7, § 26.5, at
1370-74; 8 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 477 (1926); W. Prosser, supra note 2, § 69,
at 459; Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration ofRisk (pt. 1), 38 Yale L.J. 584, 585, 592
(1929); Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor,29 Ill. L. Rev. 339, 341 (1934); Seavey,
supra note 28, at 456; Smith, supra note 39, at 456; Steffen, supra note 37, at 509.
41. 1939 Law. Rev. Comm'n Rep., supra note 26, at 626; W. Prosser, supra note 2, § 69, at
459; see note 40 supra. A few courts have also accepted this argument. E.g., United States v.
Romitti, 363 F.2d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 1966); Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 956,
959-60, 471 P.2d 988, 990, 88 Cal. Rptr. 188, 190 (1970); Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal. 2d 54, 64, 181
P.2d 645, 651 (1947); Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 273 Or. 628, 637, 542 P.2d
1031, 1035 (1975) (en banc). Professor Laski found that legal liability is placed on an employer
who has not personally been at fault "because in a social distribution of profit and loss, the
balance of least disturbance seems thereby best to be obtained." Laski, supra note 15, at 112
(footnote omitted).
42. 1939 Law Rev. Comm'n Rep., supra note 26, at 626; Seavey, supra note 28, at 450; Smith,
supra note 40, at 456-57.
43. 1939 Law Rev. Comm'n Rep., supra note 26, at 626; Seavey, supra note 28, at 450; Smith,
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cost of doing business." To say that the employer is in a better position to
distribute the loss, however, is not to say that he is better able to pay. 45 Thus,
by recognizing the possibility that the employer can protect himself by
obtaining insurance, the modern theory goes beyond the older justification
that the injured party should have access to a "deep-pocketed" 46 defendant.
Viewing the rule as an allocation of risk device is consonant with the
developing concept of enterprise liability, which states that the risk of loss
should be assumed by the enterprise for whose benefit the risk-creating work
is being performed. 47 Lord Brougham expressed the theory of enterprise
liability more than a century ago:
I am liable for what is done for me and under my orders by the man I employ ...and
the reason that I am liable is this, that by employing him I set the whole thing in
motion; and what he does, being done for my48 benefit and under my direction, I am
responsible for the consequences of doing it.
Although Lord Brougham's allusion to the master's control as a justification
for the rule of respondeat superior has been deemphasized in the modern
interpretation of the rule, 49 his emphasis on the risk-creating aspect of the
enterprise to be benefited is still very much evident. It has been manifested in
"a strong and growing tendency, where there is no blame on either side, to
ask, in view of the exigencies of social justice who can best bear the loss....
by creating liability where there has been no fault."50
supra note 40, at 456-57. Professor Smith likens the result to that obtained by workers'
compensation programs. Id. at 457 n.37; see Wambaugh, Workmen's Compensation Acts: Their
Theory and Constitutionality, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 131 (1911) ("[t]he economic theory ... being

that through enhanced price the burden passes eventually to that part of the public which is
peculiarly benefited").
44. See cases cited note 41 supra. Professor Smith thought "that it is socially more expedient
to spread or distribute among a large group of the community the losses which experience has
taught are inevitable in the carrying on of industry, than to cast the loss upon a few." Smith,
supra note 39, at 456 (footnote omitted).
45. Smith, supra note 39, at 460. Although the employer is often better able to pay in the
employer-employee situation, Professor Smith still finds that the justification is the employer's
better position regarding the spreading and distribution of the loss. Id. When an Independent
contractor is involved, this reasoning is even more persuasive. Although there is no indication in
most instances that the employer will be financially better-off than the contractor, he will
nevertheless be in a better position to insure against and thus spread the risk. See note 57 inrra.
46. Even Professor Baty, an adamant foe of vicarious liability, concluded that -the real
reason for employers' liability is [that] the damages are taken from a deep pocket." T. Baty, supra
note 30, at 154.
47. For a detailed explanation of the theory of enterprise liability, see A. Ehrenzweig,
Negligence Without Fault (1951); Feezer, A Circle Tour Through Negligence, 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
647 (1952); Leflar, Negligence in Name Only, 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 564 (1952).
48. Duncan v. Findlater, 6 C. & F. 894, 910, 7 Eng. Rep. 934, 940 (1839) (footnote omitted)
49. See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text.
50. Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 Harv. L. Rev.
195, 233 (1914); see Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 55-56 (1842) (rule
of respondeat superior is "founded on the great principle of social duty, that every man, in the
management of his own affairs, whether by himself or by his agents or servants, shall so conduct
them as not to injure another; and if he does not, and another thereby sustains damage, he shall
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In the mid-nineteenth century, the rationale underlying respondeat superior
was broadened to encompass the imposition of liability on employers of
independent contractors for injuries resulting from inherently dangerous work
performed by the contractors." Subsequently, many courts, recognizing the
employer's moral responsibility to prevent an unreasonable risk of injury to
others, have effectively imposed the relationship of master and servant on the
employer and the independent contractor to prevent the employer from
avoiding his responsibility.5 2 Conversely, some contend that the relationships
are distinct. They reason that an employer should be held liable for the harm
caused by his employees, but not for harm caused by an independent
contractor, because the employer has control over the conduct of the work in
the former instance but not in the latter.- 3 It can be persuasively argued,
however, that the control exercised over an independent
contractor may be as
54
extensive as that exercised over an employee.
Furthermore, even if the control in this situation was nonexistent, to the
extent that the true basis for the emi~loyer's liability in the master-servant
situation is not real or fictitious control 5 but is a policy of social expediency,
the same rationale supports the application of vicarious liability to both the
servant and independent contractor situations. Thus, the analysis would
require employer liability for the negligence of the independent contractor
answer for it ....

The maxim respondeat superior is adopted ... from general considerations of

policy and security."); 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 7, § 26.2, at 1365.
51. See Bower v. Peate, 1 Q.B.D. 321 (1876); Holmes, supra note 29, at 347 ("[iln such cases
there is nothing peculiar to master and servant; similar principles have been applied where
independent contractors were employed" (footnote omitted)).
52. See, e.g., Welker v. Kennecott Copper Co., 1 Ariz. App. 395, 403-04, 403 P.2d 330,
338-39 (1965); King %.Shelby Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Ky. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Epperly v. City of Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 777, 783, 399 P.2d 591, 595
(1965) ("[wlhere the inherently dangerous activity doctnne is applicable, the law invokes tile
theory of respondeat superior, imposing the master-servant relationship upon the parties engaged
in the activity, even though the [employer] has attempted to escape liability by employing an
independent contractor").
53. Blake v. Ferris, 5 N.Y. 48, 58 (1851); 1939 Law Rev. Comm'n Rep., supra note 26, at
629; 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 7, § 26.11, at 1395-96; W. Prosser, supra note 2, § 71, at
468.
54. See Note, Risk Administration in the Marketplace: A Reappraisal of the Independent
ContractorRule, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 661, 670-71 (1973). The employer can exercise a substantial
amount of control over his independent contractor by placing in the contract extensive provisions
on performance. Id. at 671; see, e.g., Sword v. Gulf Oil Corp., 251 F.2d 829, 831 n.I (5th Cir.
1958) (contract contained provisions enabling employer to retain broad control over various
aspects of the work as well as a provision attempting to preserve the independent contractor's
status). The employer can also retain broad supervisory powers "including the right to inspect,
the right to stop the work, the right to make suggestions or recommendations as to details of the
work, [and] the right to prescribe alterations or deviations in the work," without affecting the
employer-independent contractor relationship. McDonald v. Shell Oil Co., 44 Cal. 2d 785, 790,
285 P.2d 902, 904 (1955) (en banc) (citations omitted).
55. See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text. "If the fictitious control of a master over
his servant is an inadequate basis for holding the master liable, it is obvious that the transfer of
this fictitious control to an independent contractor will be in sufficient [sic] reason for exempting
the employer from liability." Harper, supra note 39, at 497-98.
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when the employer is in a better position to spread and distribute the loss. 56
This is the typical situation, regardless of the size of their relative operations,
because the employer is closest to the consumer."7 Consequently, several
commentators have called for abolition of the general rule of employer
immunity.5 8 Dean Prosser's explanation of the trend toward wider employer
liability is that the enterprise is still the employer's-"he remains the person
primarily to be benefited by it; . . . he selects the contractor, and is free to
insist upon one who is financially responsible, and to demand indemnity from
him, and . . . the insurance necessary to distribute the risk is properly a cost
of his business."5' 9 Although the general rule of employer nonliability has not
been abolished, 60 the large number of exceptions to the rule casts doubt on its
56. 1939 Law Rev. Comm'n Rep., supra note 26, at 629; W. Prosser, supra note 2 § 71, at
468.
57. Douglas, supra note 40, at 600. It can be argued that it is more equitable to place the risk
of loss on the employer because he will be able to spread it throughout society more directly The
contractor can only spread his loss indirectly by raising his price to the employer. Id. Because
contractors normally work for several employers, this may result in an unfair allocation of risk to
the present employer that did not arise out of his enterprise but from the business of some other
employer of the contractor. Id. One commentator has argued that at least in the case of the
inherently dangerous work exception, the employer is in a better position to be fully aware of the
risk involved and thus to protect himself from the possible loss involved. Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499, 547 (1961).
58. E.g., Harper, supra note 39, at 499; Laski, supra note 15, at 109. Morris, supra note 40,
at 341; see 1939 Law Rev. Comm'n Rep., supra note 26, at 628-30. Professor Harper noted that
"[slocial policy would seem to afford a justification for the application of the rule of respondeat
superior to cases of injuries caused by all independent contractors and their servants. Thus it is
that upon both 'judge's reasoning' and 'law professor's rationalizations' we are entitled to expect a
uniform rule of joint liability of the independent contractor and his employer." Harper, supra
note 39, at 499. Professor Laski remarked that Lord Brougham's theory of vicarious liability, see
note 48 supra and accompanying text, is "logically as extensible to the work of an independent
contractor." Laski, supra note 15, at 109. Another author has observed that the ends that the rule
of respondeat superior serves would be better accomplished by changing the general rule from
employer immunity to employer liability. Morris, supra note 40, at 341.
59. W. Prosser, supra note 2, § 71, at 468.
60. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted that not all commentators
have agreed that the general rule should be replaced with broadened employer liability Dean
Smith advanced the entrepreneur theory to identify the liable party. Smith, supra note 39 Under
this test, the entrepreneur, who is the person in control of the work and in a position to profit or
lose depending on the proper performance of the work, must be liable for injuries resulting from
the work because it is he who is best able to spread and distribute the loss Id. at 460-61.
Applying this theory to the normal independent contractor case-a situation that would come
within one of the exceptions to the general rule-Dean Smith decided that as to the particular
undertaking, the contractor is the entrepreneur and thus must be liable. Id. at 461. More
recently, proceeding on a theory of risk-distribution, Professor Calabresi has agreed with the
general rule of employer immunity on the ground that the independent contractor would more
likely consider the risk in his market decisions. Calabresi, supra note 57, at 545-47. Nevertheless.
when the work being performed by the independent contractor is inherently dangerous, Professor
Calabresi theorized that the employer remains liable because he is in a position to be more fully
aware of the risk involved and thus will be more likely to insure against such risk Id. From a
resource allocation point of view, the employer is a more suitable risk bearer. Id. at 546. William
0. Douglas attempted to justify the employer's immunity in independent contractor cases through
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validity. 61
Just as the doctrine of respondeat superior is now justified by social policies
concerned with efficient allocation of risk, 62 the inherently dangerous work

exception,
although originally grounded in the employer's moral responsibil63
ity,

can now be justified by the same policies of social expediency and

enterprise liability. Those courts considering the application of the inherently
dangerous work exception to employees of the independent contractor have

recognized that allocation of risk and proper imposition of liability as the
reasons for the exception, but have nevertheless reached contradictory results.

A distinct minority of jurisdictions holds that employees of the independent
a test based on four possible objectives of vicarious liability: risk avoidance, risk shifting, loss
distribution, and risk prevention. Douglas, supra note 40, at 593. As between the independent
contractor and the employer, the party in the better position to serve the ends of these four
concepts should be held liable. Id. Professor Douglas dismissed risk avoidance as a consideration
because the contractor and the employer are in an equal position to avoid the risk by not
performing the activity. Id. at 598. In actuality, it seems that the employer would be better
situated to forego the work. The work is being done at his direction, whereas the independent
contractor must know that if he does not do the work, the employer will probably hire someone
else. To hold the contractor liable on this ground would thus put him in an unfair economic
position. Professor Douglas also disregarded the risk shifting concept as a liability determining
factor because both the independent contractor and the employer have equal-access to Insurance.
Id. at 599. The cost of distributing the loss may be more efficiently passed on to the community,
thereby comporting with economic theory, by holding the employer liable. Id. at 600; see Laski,
supra note 15, at 126 (discussing the theory applicable here in relation to workers' compensation);
Smith, supra note 39, at 456 (equating the theory to that underlying workers' compensation). The
contractor would distribute the loss by raising his price to the various employers or possibly by
cutting his costs, whereas the employer is presumably in a position to pass this cost directly along
to the community at large. Douglas, supra note 40, at 600. If it is assumed, however, that the cost
being passed along is not the actual cost of insuring the risk, the employer and the independent
contractor are in identical positions. Id. at 600-01. As to the objective of risk prevention, Douglas
found that because of the contractor's freedom in choosing the servants he employs and his final
say in matters concerning the method of performance and the discharge of those servants, the
contractor is often in a better position to prevent risks. Id. at 601. Douglas therefore concluded
that "while [the independent contractor] stands in no better position than [his employer] to avoid,
shift or distribute the risks he does seem to occupy a more strategic position to prevent them." Id.
at 602. Thus, if risk prevention was weighted more heavily than administration of the risk in
determining liability, a justification would be found for holding the independent contractor,
rather than the employer, liable. Professor Douglas recommended that social and economic
factors be considered in determining these relative weights. Id. at 598-604. It appears that in the
case of inherently dangerous work, the capacity to prevent risk might still be greater for the
contractor. Thus, if this exception to the general rule of employer non-liability were to be justified
by Douglas's analysis, the employer's liability must be based on his more advantageous position
regarding administration of the risk.
61. See note 3 supra; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409, Comment b at 370 (1963) ("[the
exceptions] have so far eroded the 'general rule,' that it can now be said to be 'general' only In the
sense that it is applied where no good reason is found for departing from it"); Pacific Fire Ins.
Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co., 201 Minn. 500, 503, 277 N.W. 226, 228 (1937) ("[lindeed It
would be proper to say that the rule is now primarily important as a preamble to the catalog of Its
exceptions" (citations omitted)).
62. See notes 40-50 supra and accompanying text.
63. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
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contractor are protected by the inherently dangerous work doctrine and may,
therefore, sue the employer. 64 Most of these courts have considered only the
common law, concluding that for the purposes of this doctrine, employees of
the independent contractor should stand in no worse position than members
of the general public. 65
The majority of courts, although denying employees protection under this
exception, are not uniform in their reasoning. 66 One rationale, however,
based on a tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 67 has
emerged as the most widely accepted. The draft stated that due to the
64. E.g., Lindler v. District of Columbia, 502 F.2d 495 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Van Arsdale v.
Hollinger, 68 Cal. 2d 245, 437 P.2d 508, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1968) (en bane); Giarratano v. Weitz
Co., 259 Iowa 1292, 147 N.W.2d 824 (1967); Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., 320
Mo. 95, 6 S.W.2d 617 (1928) (en bane); International Harvester Co. v. Sartain. 32 Tenn. App.
425, 222 S.W.2d 854 (1948).
65. Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68 Cal. 2d 245, 254, 437 P.2d 508, 514, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20, 26
(1968) (en banc); Giarratano v. Weitz Co., 259 Iowa 1292, 1308, 147 N.W.2d 824, 834 (1967);
Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., 320 Mo. 95, 117, 6 S.W.2d 617, 626-27 (1928) (en
banc); International Harvester Co. v. Sartain, 32 Tenn. App. 425, 455-57, 222 S.W.2d 854,
867-68 (1948).
66. E.g., Hess v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030, 1034-35 (Sth Cir. 1977) (citing
the effect of workers' compensation; the difference between the Longshoremen's Act, which
militates against third party suits, and land-based statutes; and a desire to promote uniformity
among the circuit courts by following the majority rule), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978);
Parsons v. Amerada Hess Corp., 422 F.2d 610, 614 (10th Cir. 1970) (citing the effect of workers'
compensation); Corban v. Skelly Oil Co., 256 F.2d 775, 780 (5th Cir. 1958) (employee not the
"third person" whom the rule is designed to protect); Welker v. Kennecott Copper Co., I Ariz.
App. 395, 403-04, 403 P.2d 330, 339 (1965) (citing the effect of workers' compensation; the
language of comments to relevant sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts; the confusion
caused by the nebulous distinctions drawn in defining inherently dangerous work; and the
number of risks present on any construction job); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Price, 170 So. 2d
293, 298 (Fla. 1964) (due to the independent contractor's relationship to the employer and the
concomitant assumption of the risks, the employer will not be liable to the independent
contractor's employees absent a showing of positive negligence by the employer); King v, Shelby
Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659, 662-63 (Ky. 1973) (citing the effect of workers'
compensation on employers' "escaping" liability and on the creation of greater liability of the
employer for the independent contractor's employees), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Epperly
v. City of Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 777, 786-87, 399 P.2d 591, 597-98 (1965) (inherently dangerous
work exception classified as one involving strict liability, precluding protection for employee of
contractor who created the hazard). A cogent argument for employer nonliability was presented
in Olson v. Kilstofte & Vosejpka, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 583 (D. Minn. 1971), aff'd per curiam sub
nom. Olson v. Red Wing Shoe Co., 456 F.2d 1299 (8th Cir. 1972). The Olson Court reasoned that
literal interpretation of the inherently dangerous work doctrine destroys the liability barrier
between the employer and the independent contractor. Id. at 587. Therefore, it concluded that as
to inherently dangerous work, the independent contractor is actually the agent of the owner. Id.
Under a well established rule of agency, the employer, as principal, would be subject to no
greater liability than its agent. Id. Because the contractor in Olson was covered by workers'
compensation, he was immune from suit. Id. It thus followed that the employer should be
similarly immune from suit. Id. at 587-88; see Corban v. Skelly Oil Co., 256 F.2d at 780-81 (for
purposes of the performance of inherently dangerous work, employees of the independent
contractor are employees of the employer).
67. Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 15, special note 17-18 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962)
[hereinafter cited as Restatement, Tentative Draft, special note].
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existence of workers' compensation statutes, which provide that an employee's
injuries sustained in industrial accidents are to be compensated solely through
insurance, 68 the exceptions to the general rule of employer nonliability should
not apply to employees of independent contractors. 69 Under the typical
workers' compensation statute, the insurance premiums are paid by the
employee's direct employer, 7 0 in this case, the independent contractor. The
rationale of the draft assumes that the cost of the premiums will be included
in the contractor's price.7 1 Consequently, the employer has, in effect, paid for
7 2
the employee's coverage and thus has not escaped or shifted his liability.

Although the relevant language of the tentative draft was not included in 73
the
final publication, most courts continue to treat it as persuasive authority.
Another reason advanced by the majority for not extending the protection
of the inherently dangerous work exception to employees of independent
contractors has been a fear of creating an "unwarranted windfall" for injured
workers. 74 If the employee was permitted to sue the employer of the independent contractor, he would be entitled to a common law recovery in addition to
that provided by workers' compensation, 7 5 whereas if he had been injured
through his direct employer's negligence, his recovery would be statutorily
limited. 76 These courts also discuss this problem in terms of the employer's
liability. Because the employer of the independent contractor has in effect
borne the cost of the workers' compensation coverage for the employees of the
independent contractor, to hold him vicariously liable and thus subject to a
68.

Id. at 17; see Appendix infra.

69. Restatement, Tentative Draft, special note, supra note 67, at 17-18. It must be noted that
in some instances, the independent contractor will not be required to provide workers' compensation coverage for his employees, for example, when the state's statute is elective and the
contractor chooses not to comply, or when the employment in which the employees are engaged is
one specifically exempted from coverage by the statute. See Appendix infra, cols. B, D. In such
cases, the rationale of the tentative draft will not apply.
70. Id.; see Appendix infra, col. C.
71. Restatement, Tentative Draft, special note, supra note 67, at 17-18.
72. Id.; see Vagle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 704 (1980); Welker v. Kennecott Copper Co., 1 Ariz. App. 395, 404, 403 P.2d
330, 339 (1965); King v. Shelby Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Ky. 1973), cert.

denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
73. See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1967). The Eutsler court reasoned
that the tentative draft was persuasive authority because it had been cited by several courts, e.g.,
Richardson v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 107, 112-13 (W.D. Tenn. 1966); Welker v. Kennecott
Copper Co., 1 Ariz. App. 395, 402-03, 403 P.2d 330, 337-38 (1965), prior to publication. 376 F.2d
at 636. Explaining why the language was not included in the final draft, Dean Prosser cited the
lack of uniform effect of the various states' workers' compensation statutes and concluded "that It
appears undesirable, if not impossible, to state anything at all about what the liability is to
employees of an independent contractor." ALI Proceedings, supra note 5, at 246 (statement of
William Prosser).
74. Vagle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 704 (1980); see Cochran v. International Harvester Co., 408 F. Supp. 598, 603 (W.D. Ky.
1975); King v. Shelby Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Ky. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 932 (1974).
75. See Appendix infra, cols. G, H.
76. See Appendix infra, col. E.
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common law action would expose him to greater liability to the independent
contractor's employees than to his own employees."7 Finding no "valid
independent contractor's employees
reason" for this result, the courts deny the
78
a right of action against the employer.
The courts espousing the minority view have generally not addressed the
effect of workers' compensation statutes on the employer's liability." In
Lindler v. District of Columbia,8" the District of Columbia Circuit, while
recognizing the effect of workers' compensation statutes, concluded that the
existence of such legislation was of secondary importance. The court held that
an employee of the independent contractor could maintain a cause of action
based on the inherently dangerous work doctrine against the employer of the
independent contractor. 8' The court argued that its holding was buttressed by
the general rule that workers' compensation acts must be construed liberally
in favor of the injured employee. 8 2- Furthermore, the Lindler court found it
persuasive that the final version of the Restatement (Second) did not contain
the draft language supporting the majority result.8 3 In the court's view, "[tlhe
bear the costs, but rather who does the
question is not who may ultimately
'84
law require to bear the costs."

Any rule of vicarious liability, including the inherently dangerous work
exception, effectuates an attempt to allocate the risks of industry to society as
a whole.8Y Underlying this ultimate goal is the fundamental objective of tort
law-compensation of the injured party. 86 The majority courts' refusal to
77. Vagle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir 1979). cert denied, 100
S. Ct. 704 (1980); Cochran v. International Harvester Co.. 408 F Supp. 598. 603 (W D Ky
1975); King v. Shelby Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659. 663 (Ky 19731. cert denied,
417 U.S. 932 (1974). The King court believed that allowing this result would have a deleterious
effect on employee safety. Id. ('The imposition of additional tort liability upon the employer
because of the selection of an independent contractor would have a tendency to discourage the
practice of selecting skilled independent contractors and cause employers to do the work with
their own, sometimes less skilled, work force."). Professor Harper argued the opposite, citing the
prophylactic effect on employee injuries as a further reason for establishing a broad rule of
employer liability. F. Harper, A Treatise on the Law of Torts § 292, at 646 (1933)
78. King v. Shelby Rural Elec. Coop. Corp.. 502 SW 2d 659, 662-63 (Ky 1973). cert
denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); see Vagle v. Pickands Mather & Co.. 611 F 2d 1212, 1219 t8th Cir
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 704 (1980); Cochran v. International Harvester Co . 408 F Supp
598, 603 (W.D. Ky. 1975).
79. See Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68 Cal. 2d 245, 437 P 2d 508, 66 Cal Rptr 20 11968) ten
banc); Giarratano v. Weitz Co., 259 Iowa 1292. 147 N.W.2d 824 (1967) Mallory v Louisiana
Pure Ice & Supply Co., 320 Mo. 95, 6 S.W.2d 617 (1928) (en band; International Harvester Co
v. Sartain, 32 Tenn. App. 425, 222 S.W.2d 854 (1948).
80. 502 F.2d 495 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
81. Id. at 500.
82. Id. at 498-99; accord, Ellis Hosp. v. Symonds, 96 Misc 2d 643, 644, 409 N Y S 2d 630.
632 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Cal. Lab. Code § 3202 (1971). The principle of liberal construction, however,
is not to be used to defeat the plain meaning of any provision Gawrys v Buffalo Bolt Co , 302
N.Y. 312, 317, 98 N.E.2d 452, 453-54 (1951).
83. 502 F.2d at 499; see note 73 supra.
84. 502 F.2d at 499.
85. See notes 40-50, 62-63 supra and accompanying text
86. See 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 7. at 743; Comment, Responsibility for the Torts
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permit the independent contractor's employee to take advantage of the
inherently dangerous work exception to employer immunity comports with
these policies and the objectives of workers' compensation: to ensure certain
recovery for the injured employee, 87 to provide limited and determinate
liability of employers, 88 and to allocate the costs. 8 9 This rationale, however,
fails to explain why the same courts are willing to allow an action grounded in
the negligence of the employer. 90 The explanation of this apparent inconsistency can be found by analyzing the reasons underlying the inherently
dangerous work doctrine and their relationship to workers' compensation
statutes.
II.

THE EFFECT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LEGISLATION

The first workers' compensation statute in a common law country was
enacted by the English Parliament in 189791 in response to the increasing
incidence of industrial injuries coupled with the decreasing number of remedies available to injured employees. 9 2 In the United States, compensation
of An Independent Contractor, 39 Yale L.J. 861, 872 (1930) ("Unquestionably the factor which
makes the strongest appeal to the courts [considering the inherently dangerous work exception) Is
the desire to assure certainty of compensation to the injured party.").
87. See Mustapha v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 890, 892 (D.R.I,), qff'd, 387 F.2d
631 (1st Cir. 1967) (per curiarn); Kuhn v. Grant County, 201 Kan. 163, 171, 439 PR2d 155, 161
(1968); Naseef v. Cord, Inc., 48 N.J. 317, 322 n.1, 225 A.2d 343, 346 n.1 (1966); Lee v. Jacobs,
81 Wash. 2d 937, 939, 506 P.2d 308, 310 (1973) (en hanc).
88. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159 (1932); Smither & Co. v.
Coles, 242 F.2d 220, 222 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957); Provo v. Bunker Hill
Co., 393 F. Supp. 778, 780-81 (D. Idaho 1975); Busey v. Washington, 225 F. Supp. 416, 423
(D.D.C. 1964); Maiuri v. Sinacola Constr. Co., 12 Mich. App. 22, 27, 162 N.W.2d 344, 346
(1968), aff'd, 382 Mich. 391, 170 N.W.2d 27 (1969); State ex rel. Morgan v. Industrial Accident
Bd., 130 Mont. 272, 286, 300 P.2d 954, 962 (1956); Wilson v. Faull, 27 N.J. 105, 116, 141 A.2d
768, 774 (1958); Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., 266 N.C 419, 427, 146 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1966);
Morrisseau v. Legac, 123 Vt. 70, 76, 181 A.2d 53, 57 (1962).
89. See Hannon v. Industrial Comm'n, 9 Ariz. App. 2.31, 232, 451 P.2d 44, 45 (1969); Spratlin
v. Evans, 260 Ark. 49, 55, 538 S.W.2d 527, 531 (1976); Jones v. Leon County Health Dep't, 335
So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. 1976); Mier v. Staley, 28 Il1. App. 3d 373, 379, 329 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1975);
Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 251, 297 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1973); Brown v.
Palmer Constr. Co., 295 A.2d 263, 265 (Me. 1972); Brenne v. Department of Indus., Labor &
Human Relations, 38 Wis. 2d 84, 91-92, 156 N.W.2d 497, 500 (1968); H. Bradbury, Workmen's
Compensation Law 2 (3d ed. 1917); 1 W. Schneider, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 1,
at 2 (1922).
90. E.g., Vagle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 704 (1980); cf. Cochran v. International Harvester Co., 408 F. Supp. 598, 603 (W.D. Ky.
1975); Welker v. Kennecott Copper Co., 1 Ariz. App. 395, 404-05, 403 P.2d 330, 339-40 (1965).
91. British Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37; see I A. Larson,
supra note 18, § 5.20, at 37.
92. See 1 A. Larson, supra note 18, § 4. For a history of the development of workers'
compensation, see H. Bradbury, supra note 89, at 12-17, 53-62; Larson, The Nature and Origins
of Workmen's Compensation, 37 Cornell L.Q. 206, 221-34 '1952). At common law, a master owed
the following duties to his servant: (1) to provide and maintain a reasonably safe place to work,
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9
statutes have been enacted in every state93 and in the District of Columbia.
In addition, a number of federal acts provide coverage for specific classes of
employees who might not otherwise be covered by the state enactments.9
The basic function of the statutes is to replace the uncertain common law
system of compensation 96 with a system that automatically compensates an

with safe appliances, tools, and equipment; (2) to provide a sufficient number of suitable and
competent employees; (3) to warn employees of unusual dangers about which they might be
unaware; and (4) to establish and enforce rules necessary for the safe performance of the work.
W. Prosser, supra note 2 § 80, at 526. The injured worker's recovery was limited to cases in
which he could prove that his employer had failed to exercise reasonable care as to one of these
specific duties. Id. In the early nineteenth century, an employee's chances of recovery were
further restricted by the development of a trio of defenses available to the employer contributory
negligence, Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809) (per curiam), the
fellow servant rule, Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837), and
assumption of the risk. Id. Under the doctrine of contributory negligence established in Butterfield, if the employee's own negligence contributes in any way, however small, to his injury,
then the employer would not be liable even though he was directly negligent. 11 East at 61. 103
Eng. Rep. at 927. The fellow-servant rule established in Priestly provides that the employer will
not be liable for an employee's injuries caused by a coemployee. 3 M. & W. at 6-7, 150 Eng. Rep.
at 1032-33. This is a dramatic limitation on the general rule of the master's vicarious liability for
the torts of his servants. The third curtailment of the employee's chances of recovery came with
the doctrine of assumption of the risk. The Priestly court stated: "The servant is not bound to risk
his safety in the service of his master, and may, if he thinks fit, decline any service in which he
reasonably apprehends injury to himself: and in most of the cases in which danger may be
incurred, if not in all, he is just as likely to be acquainted with the probability and extent of it as
the master." 3 M. & W. at 6, 150 Eng. Rep. at 1032-33.
An analysis of German labor statistics classifying the cause of accidents in 1907 revealed that
between injuries caused through no fault of the employer and those caused either by a coemployee
or by joint negligence of the employer and the employee, injured employees would go remediless
in 83% of all cases. 1 A. Larson, supra note 18, § 4.30, at 27. In the remaining 17% the employer
retained the advantage of the defense of assumption of the risk and the employee was still
required to face the uncertainty of proving the employer's negligence in court. Id. at 27-28. It is
not surprising then that a study conducted by a New York State commission in 1910 found that
87% of industrial accidents litigated under the common law system went uncompensated. I
Commission to Inquire into the Question of Employers' Liability and Other Matters, First Report
to the Legislature of the State of New York 25 (1910) [hereinafter cited as Wainwright Comm'n].
A report issued by a national commission in 1972 concluded that workers' compensation
programs are still superior to a system relying on damage suits. Report of the Natl Comm'n on
State Workmen's Compensation Laws 119-20 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Report on Workmen's
Comp. Laws].
93. See Appendix infra.
94. See Appendix infra.
95. Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101(1) (1976) (coverage for employees
of the federal government); Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
902(3) (1976) (coverage for persons engaged in maritime employment, with the exception of those
employed on vessels); see Appendix infra.
96. See 1 W. Schneider, supra note 89, § 1, at 1. The Wainwright Commission, established in
New York in 1909 to study the feasibility of a workers' compensation act, concluded -that the
present system.., rests on a basis that is economically unwise and unfair, and that in operation
it is wasteful, uncertain, and productive of antagonism between workmen and employers."
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employee for any injury arising out of his employment. 97 The common law
concept of liability based on fault 98 is disregarded, and compensation is
awarded without consideration of the negligence or fault of either the employee or his employer. 99 The result is a trade-off-the employer forfeits his
common law defenses' 00 and assumes automatic liability; the employee forfeits his right to a potentially lucrative common law judgment.' 0'
The social policy underlying this system is that "the cost of the product
should bear the blood of the vorking man."'10 2 Workers' compensation
Wainwright Comm'n, supra note 92, at 68. For a discussion of the uncertainty of the common
law system, see note 92 supra.
97. 1 A. Larson, supra note 18, § 1.10, at 1. ("[Tlhe basic operating principle [of a typical
workers' compensation statute] is that an employee is automatically entitled to certain benefits
whenever he suffers a 'personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.' "); see, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Dunn Bros. Gen'l Contractors, Inc., 294 F. Supp.
704, 707 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); Lee Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. Fellows, 209 So. 2d 454, 456 (Fla. 1968);
Roberts v. American Chain & Cable Co., 259 A.2d 43, 46 (Me. 1969). Unlike tort theory, under
which the injured party is compensated to the extent that he is made whole and recovers his
actual loss, compensation theory limits an injured employee's recovery to an amount that will
enable him to exist without being a burden to others. 1 A. Larson, supra note 18, § 2.50, at 11;
see, e.g., Pnigosin v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Ariz. 87, 89, 546 P.2d 823, 825 (1976) (en banc);
Scheer v. City of Syracuse, 53 Misc. 2d 80, 82, 277 N.Y.S.2d 866, 868 (1967). Larson points out
that the probable reason for limiting the benefits is to discourage malingering by injured
employees. 1 A. Larson, supra note 18, § 2.50, at 12. For an analysis of the adequacy of the scale
of payments, see National Comm'n on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, Compendium on
Workmen's Compensation 113-60 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Compendium on Workmen's
Comp.]; A. Reede, Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation (1947); H. Somers & A. Somers,
Workmen's Compensation (1954). The National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation
Laws presented five major objectives for a modern workers' compensation program: (1) "Broad
coverage of employees and of work-related injuries and diseases;" protection to be extended to as
many workers as feasible, and all work-related injuries and diseases to be covered; (2) "Substantial protection against interruption of income;" (3) "Provision of sufficient medical care and
rehabilitation service;" (4) "Encouragement of safety" through economic incentives based on the
number of injuries compensated; and (5) "An effective system for delivery of the benefits and
services." Report on Workmen's Comp. Laws, supra note 92, at 15.
98. See note 92 supra.
99. E.g., N.Y. Work. Comp. Law § 10 (McKinney 1965) ("Every employer subject to this
chapter shall . . . secure compensation to his employees and pay or provide compensation for
their disability or death from injury arising out of and in the course of the employment without
regard to fault as a cause of the injury ... "(emphasis added)). The statutes provide "not only for
employees a remedy which is both expeditious and independent of proof of fault, but also for
employers a liability which is limited and determinate." Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286
U.S. 145, 159 (1932); Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220, 222 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 354
U.S. 914 (1957); Maiuri v. Sinacola Constr. Co., 12 Mich. App. 22, 27, 162 N.W.2d 344, 346
(1968), aff'd, 382 Mich. 391, 170 N.W.2d 27 (1969).
100. See note 92 supra.
101. This compromise is commonly known as "the quid pro quo" of workers' compensation,
Compendium on Workmen's Comp., supra note 97, at 23; see cases cited note 97 supra.
102. Compendium on Workers' Comp., supra note 97, at 21. This phrase reflects the trade
risk theory of workers' compensation, which provides that at least part of the cost of workers'
compensation insurance can be passed along to the consumer through increased prices for the
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statutes embody the goal of providing efficient, dignified, and certain benefits
for employees injured on the job, "which an enlightened community would
feel obliged to provide in any case in some less satisfactory form." 1 3 Furthermore, the mechanics of the system-buying insurance and including its
cost in the price of the employer's goods or services-reflect the view that the
consumer is the most appropriate source of payment because by spreading out
the overall costs, the individual costs will be minimized.'10 The conceptual
bases of workers' compensation programs and vicarious liability therefore
appear to be identical: compensation of the injured party at the expense of the
party in the best position to distribute the loss. 10 s Although the problem in
cases of injury to ordinary members of the public is identifying the party who
can most effectively administer the risk,10 6 the legislatures of the various
states have resolved this issue in cases involving injuries to employees by
0 7
placing responsibility on the injured employee's "employer.'
When a third person negligently injures an employee during the course of
his employment, most workers' compensation statutes allow the employee to
goods or services, the production of which gave rise to industrial accidents. Dawson, The
Constitutionalityof Workmens' Compensation and Compulsory InsuranceLaws, 22 Case & Com.
275, 278 (1915).
103. 1 A. Larson, supra note 18, § 2.20, at 5; see H. Bradbury, supra note 89, at 2; 1 W.
Schneider, supra note 89, at 2-3.
104. See Girardi v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 174 F. Supp. 813, 816 (E.D. Pa. 1959),
affd, 275 F.2d 492 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 821 (1960); Price v. All Am. Eng'r Co., 320
A.2d 336, 341 (Del. 1974); Brown v. Palmer Constr. Co., 295 A.2d 263, 265 (Me. 1972); Whetro
v. Awkerman, 383 Mich. 235, 242, 174 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1970); State ex rel. Morgan v.
Industrial Accident Bd., 130 Mont. 272, 277, 300 P.2d 954, 957 (1956); Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay
& Curt Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 508, 330 N.E.2d 603, 605, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 640 (1975); Gunter v.
Mersereau, 7 Or. App. 470, 472, 491 P.2d 1205, 1206-07 (1971); Brenne v. Department of Indus.,
Labor & Human Relations, 38 Wis. 2d 84, 91-92, 156 N.W.2d 497, 500 (1968).
105. See notes 40-50, 102-04 supra and accompanying text. In comparing the theories
underlying compensation statutes and the doctrine of respondeat superior, Dean Smith asserted
that workers' compensation statutes accomplish for employees what the common law, through the
doctrine of respondeat superior, accomplishes for other plaintiffs. Smith, supra note 39, at 457.
Dean Smith further claimed that "[h]ad the fellow servant rule not interfered to prevent the
common law from more adequately dealing with the case of injuries to employees, compensation
acts might not have been passed." Id. at 457 n.40. The theories advanced in justification of the
various forms of vicarious liability in Part II are similar to those advanced by economists
espousing the "least social cost" theory of workers' compensation. H. Downey. Workmen's
Compensation 35 (1924). The basis of the theory is that because injuries are an inevitable result of
modern industry and because the victims of such injuries are the least able to bear the loss
themselves or to shift it to others, public policy demands that the risk be distributed throughout
society. Id. at 14-15. The least burdensome and most equitable distribution of the loss would be
realized if the cost of industrial injuries was considered a direct expense of production. Id. This
expense would thus be charged to the employer, who, as the entrepreneur, could protect himself
by obtaining appropriate insurance and distributing this cost by increasing the prices charged for
the goods and services he offered to consumers. Id.; see Wanbaugh. supra note 43, at 130-32;
Witte, The Theory of Workmen's Compensation, 20 Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. 411, 411-18 (1930).
106. See notes 41-46, 56-59 supra and accompanying text.
107. See Wambaugh, supra note 43, at 134; Appendix infra, col. C.
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bring a common law action against that person. 10 8 The reasons are clear:
preserving the employee's common law right when a third person is negligent
reflects a legal and moral obligation to place the loss upon the ultimate
wrongdoer. 109 Most statutes also contain "statutory employer" or "contractor
under" provisions extending the concept of "employer" and the liability
inherent therein beyond the employee's direct employer." 0 Although the
provisions vary widely from state to state, 1 ' their general purpose is to make
the "principal" or "general" contractor liable for compensation to the employees of his subcontractors. 1 12 The general contractor is in effect made the
employer of those employees and so enjoys an employer's immunity from
common law suit. 1 3 Liability is usually limited to employees of uninsured
108. See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 3852 (West 1971) ("The claim of an employee for
compensation does not affect his claim or right of action for all damages proximately resulting
from such injury or death against any person other than the employer."); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon 1979) ("Where the injury for which compensation is payable under
this law was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than the
subscriber to pay damages in respect thereof, the employee may proceed either at law against that
person to recover damages or against the association for compensation under this law, and if he
proceeds at law against the person other than the subscriber, then he shall not be held to have
waived his rights to compensation under this law."); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 102.29 (West 1973) ("The
making of a claim for compensation against an employer . . . shall not affect the right of the
employe, his personal representative, or.other person entitled to bring action, to make claim or
maintain an action in tort against any other party for such injury or death. . . ."); Appendix itfra,
cols. G, H.
109. E.g., N.Y. Work. Comp. Law § 29 (McKinney Supp. 1979); 2 A. Larson, supra note 18,
§ 71.10. Larson points out that respondeat superior and other distortions of common law fault
concepts that have been instituted for reasons of social policy, are limited to assuring recovery for
the injured person. Id. Once this recovery has been assured, the distortions have never changed
the placement of ultimate liability. Id. The concept of vicarious liability, however, is itself based
on social policy. See pt. II infra. In situations involving vicarious liability for injuries to
employees, therefore, there is a convergence of a common law rule, the inherently dangerous
work doctrine, and a statutory enactment, workers' compensation. Both are based on social
policy, and both are designed to compensate the injured party. Thus, when the employer has not
been at fault, there is no need to allow third party actions against him beyond the scope of the
statute.
110. Forty-four states (all but California, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Rhode Island, and West
Virginia) now have such statutes. See Appendix infra, cols. I-M.
111. See Appendix infra, cols. I-M.
112. 1B A. Larson, supra note 18, § 49.11, at 9-1 to -2; 2A id. § 72.31, at 14-47; see
Appendix infra, cols. I-M.
113. Nicks v. Electron Corp., 478 P.2d 683, 684-85 (Colo. 1970); Whittenberg Eng'r &
Constr. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 390 S.W.2d 877, 882 (Ky. 1965); Mosley v. Jones, 224 Miss.
725, 732, 80 So. 2d 819, 821 (1955). A contrary rule based on the theory that the general
contractor is merely an insurer of the subcontractor's compensation obligation and hence not an
employer has been adopted in Arkansas, New York, and Wisconsin. Carter v. Fraser Constr.
Co., 219 F. Supp. 650 (W.D. Ark. 1963); Sweezey v. Are Elec. Constr. Co., 295 N.Y. 306, 67
N.E.2d 369 (1946); Culbertson v. Kieckhefer Container Co., 197 Wis. 349, 222 N.W. 249 (1928).
This theory has been attacked as a "pre-occupation with labels at the expense of substance." 2A
A. Larson, supra note 18, § 72.31, at 14-57. For a discussion of problems arising when all of the
elements necessary to the general contractor's liability are not present, as when the subcontractor
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contractors because the purpose of these provisions is to protect employees of
irresponsible contractors by placing ultimate responsibility on the principal
contractor, who is in a position to hire selectively only insured subcontractors.

1 14

Frequently, however, an employer of an independent contractor would not
come within these contractor under provisions.115 Some courts, for instance,
have held that work that might be considered inherently dangerous did not

satisfy the statutory requirement that it be part of the employer's regular

"trade or business."'1 16 Similarly, several courts, construing statutes that
require that the work contracted out is itself the subject of a contract, " 7 have
found owners of premises not liable for compensation to employees of
is insured under a statute limiting the general contractor's liability to situations where the
subcontractor is uninsured, see id. at 14-49 to -56. Larson finds the preferred rule to be that
which is presently applied in a growing number of cases granting the general contractor immunity
when the subcontractor is insured and when compensation has been paid by the subcontractor.
Id. at 14-55 to -56. The potential liability assumed by the general contractor should be enough to
satisfy the quid pro quo requirement for immunity. Id. at 14-56. The rule is also supported by the
practical realization that the employer has in effect paid for the coverage because the subcontractor has presumably included this cost in his contract price. Id.; see notes 71-72 supra and
accompanying text.
114. Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor Servs., Inc., 613 F.2d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1980);
Evary v. E & F Constr. Co., 27 Conn. Supp. 278, 281, 236 A.2d 328, 330 (Super. Ct. 1967);
Cogley v. Schnaper & Koren Constr. Co., 14 Md. App. 322, 331-32, 286 A.2d 819, 824-25 (1972);
Tayloe Paper Co. v. W.F. Jameson Constr. Co., 211 Tenn. 232, 235, 364 S.W.2d 882, 884
(1963); 1B A. Larson, supra note 18, § 49.11, at 9-6 to -7. For a summary of the various types of
provisions, see Appendix infra, cols. I-M.
115. One purpose of these statutes is to prevent a person from furthering his own enterprise
by having work performed by independent contractors for whose compensation coverage he is not
responsible. See Van Bibben's case, 343 Mass. 443, 448, 179 N.E.2d 253, 256-57 (1962). Thus,
the statutes often refer to work that is the general contractor's regular trade or business. For
example, Connecticut's "contractor-under" statute provides that the work being performed must
be "a part or process in the trade or business of [the] principal employer." Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 31-291 (West 1972). The Massachusetts provision does not impose liability when the contract is
for work "which is merely ancillary and incidental to, and is no part of or process in, the trade or
business carried on by the [principal employer]." Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 152, § 18 (Michie Law.
Co-op 1976). Virginia's statute attaches liability when the work done is part of the principal
employer's "trade, business or occupation." Va. Code § 65.1-29, -30 (1973). Connecticut provides
additionally that the work be "performed in, on or about premises under [the principal
employer's] control." Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-291 (West 1972). The issue of whether the work
performed is part of the principal employer's trade or business is a question of fact and has often
been answered by determining whether the work would ordinarily be done by the principal
employer's own employees. E.g., Battistelli v. Connohio, Inc., 138 Conn. 646, 88 A.2d 372
(1952); Cannon v. -Crowley, 318 Mass. 373, 61 N.E.2d 662 (1945); Shell Oil Co. v. Leftwich, 212
Va. 715, 187 S.E.2d 162 (1972); see 1B A. Larson, supra note 18, § 49.12 at 9-12.
116. E.g., Chappell v. Olin-Mathieson Chem. Corp., 305 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Tenn. 1969)
(electrical installation work during owner's plant expansion); Gigliotti v. United Illuminating Co.,
151 Conn. 114, 193 A.2d 718 (1963) (construction of a new electric substation); Poirier v
Plymouth, - Mass. _, 372 N.E.2d 212 (1978) (painting a large water tank).
117. E.g., N.Y. Work. Comp. Law § 56 (McKinney 1965); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-915 (1977);
see Appendix infra, cois. I-M.
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contractors engaged to perform work on the premises."18 In many situations,

therefore, the employer would not be immune from suit as an "employer" and
would be subject to a common law action based on his third party liability for
the injuries to the independent contractor's employees. When the inherently
dangerous work doctrine applies, however, the employer's liability is
vicarious-that is, it is imputed from the actual negligence of the independent
contractor. 119 Therefore, because the employer is free of fault, the third-party
actions provided for in the statutes based on "reaching the ultimate
wrongdoer" seem inapplicable. 120
If the justification for imposing vicarious liability on the employer is the
same as that for workers' compensation coverage, a conflict exists as to which
form of liability best serves the intended ends. This conflict should be resolved
in favor of the workers' compensation statutes because the legislatures have
decided that they are the most socially desirable and economically efficient
method to remedy injuries to employees.' 21 The remedy provided by the
statute is exclusive once the employer-employee relationship, statutory or
direct, has been established; 22 if the employer is uninsured, however, the
statutes allow the employee to sue at common law, but the employer generally
loses his common law defenses. 123 If this relationship has not been demonstrated, traditional common law principles apply. 124 Because the employer of
the independent contractor in many cases is not a statutory employer, the
latter rule will apply. When those employers are vicariously liable to the
118. Dewhurst v. Simon, 295 N.Y. 352, 67 N.E.2d 578 (1946) (owner of premises not liable
for compensation to employees of independent contractor hired to erect a building on the owner's
land); Drayton v. First Ave. Holding Corp., 50 A.D.2d 1046, 377 N.Y.S.2d 760 (3d Dep't 1975)
(owner not liable as "contractor" for compensation coverage for employees of independent
contractor hired to make repairs on owner's building). Some states have statutes which confer tort
immunity on employers engaged in "a common enterprise," when the injured employee has
received compensation from his direct employer. E.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 176.061(4) (West Supp.
1980). Under this provision, it has been held that the mere making of repairs on the principal
employer's premises does not constitute a common enterprise between the owner and tile
independent contractor. Vagle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212, 1219 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 704 (1980); Chenette v. Trustees of Iowa College, 431 F.2d 49, 53 (8th
Cir. 1970). For a discussion of holdings concerning different types of work performed under the
various statutes, see 1B A. Larson, supra note 18, § 49.12.
119. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
120. In those states in which the inherently dangerous work doctrine is viewed as involving
the employer's own negligence, the moral notion of "reaching the ultimate wrongdoer" may still
be valid. Because the justification for these actions is based on the employer's fault, the analysis
contained in this Note is not applicable. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Wainwright Comm'n, supra note 92, at 68-69 (calling for institution of a
workers' compensation program so that "the shock of [industrial] accident[s] may be borne by the
community"); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 51.04.010 (Supp. 1979) (declaring that purpose of
instituting Washington's workers' compensation statute was to remedy the "economically unwise
and unfair" common law system by providing employees with sure and certain compensation
under the act).
122. See Appendix infra, col. E.
123. See Appendix infra, col. F; note 92 supra.
124. See Appendix infra, cols. G, H.
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contractors' employees injured during the performance of inherently dangerous work, however, the rule creating common law liability should be inapplicable when the employee is covered by the independent contractor's
workers' compensation insurance. The judiciary has recognized that when the
social and economic policies behind a rule cease to exist, the rule should no
longer be applied.1 25 Given the existence of workers' compensation statutes,
the social policy supporting the vicarious liability imposed by the inherently
dangerous work exception has already been amply served when the injured
party is one of the contractor's insured employees. Therefore, these employees
should not be allowed to maintain a common law cause of action against the
employer.
III.

A

PROPOSED APPROACH

The result reached in the majority of jurisdictions--exclusion of the employees of the independent contractor from the protection of the inherently
dangerous work exception-is proper in light of the socio-legal interplay of
concepts of vicarious liability and workers' compensation. Determining the
employee's right to compensation solely by reference to existing workers'
compensation statutes, however, may lead to problems.
Under existing statutes, it is unlikely that the employer of the independent
contractor would be considered a "statutory employer;'11 26 thus, he would not
be responsible for the compensation coverage for the independent contractor's
employees. Consequently, the employer has little incentive to hire a financially responsible and insured contractor. If he hires an uninsured contractor,
under the analysis previously presented, workers' compensation statutes will
have no applicability and the employer could be held vicariously liable for the
negligence of the contractor in the performance of inherently dangerous work.
It is doubtful that this alone will provide the necessary incentive. The
employer may be willing to take the risk of common law liability if he can
have the work done less expensively. An uninsured contractor's price will
usually be less than that of an insured contractor, because the uninsured
contractor has no workers' compensation coverage costs to pass along to the
employer. This system also has the disadvantage of basing the injured
employee's recovery on a common law suit. Although the uncertainty of these
actions against uninsured contractors has been remedied by statutory provisions eliminating the direct employer's common law defenses,' 7 ordinary
common law ainciples will apply in a suit against the indirect employer if he
is not liable in the first instance for the employee's compensation insurance. ' 28
A desire to avoid the uncertainty of these actions is one reason that led the
legislatures to enact workers' compensation statutes. 129
125. E.g., Long v. Landy, 35 N.J. 44, 51, 171 A.2d 1. 4 (1961). see notes 15-17 supra and
accompanying text.
126.
127.
128.

See notes 115-18 and accompanying text
See note 92 supra.
See notes 108-09, 122-24 supra and accompanying text

129.

See notes 96-101 supra and accompanying text
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It is therefore proposed that through either legislative enactment or judicial
interpretation, employers of independent contractors engaged in inherently
dangerous work be placed in the position of "statutory employers" and be held
responsible for compensation coverage for the employees of uninsured contractors. If the independent contractor is adequately insured, compensation
should be recovered through his insurance. Thus, the employer will have no
liability for compensation and will be immune from a third party suit because
of his status as a statutory employer. He will, however, have effectively paid
for the contractor's employees' coverage through costs passed along through
the contractor's price for the work. If the contractor is uninsured, compensation can be recovered from the employer's insurance. If neither is insured, a
common law action could be brought against both; neither, however, would
retain their common law defenses.
Although enactment of a statutory provision would be the preferable
solution to this problem, it may not be practical because of the difficulty the
courts have had in defining inherently dangerous work. Therefore, the
problem may have to be resolved by the courts. Proceeding under the general
rule of liberal interpretation, 30 the courts should relax the statutory "trade or
business" requirement in cases involving inherently dangerous work. 13' If the
work is considered part of the employer's regular trade or business, the
employer will be classified as a "statutory employer" of the contractor's
employees.' 32 In states such as New York, however, which require that, to
impose the status of "statutory employer," the contracted work itself must be
the subject of a contract,' 33 the courts will have great difficulty in fitting the
employer into these provisions. Thus, in such circumstances, it appears that
legislative action would be the only solution.
This system has the advantage of placing the ultimate social and economic
burden of employee safety on the employer for whose benefit the inherently
dangerous work is being performed. The employer can relieve himself of this
burden by hiring a financially responsible contractor. At the same time, the
burden of risk prevention, the primary safety factor, is placed on the
independent contractor, who is usually in a better position to provide for his
own employees' safety in any event. A concrete methodology is thus established for determining liability for injuries to employees of independent
contractors occurring during the performance of inherently dangerous work.
The employee is compensated fairly and efficiently through workers' compensation; the employer does not escape his moral responsibility; the independent

See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
As an example of the courts' liberal interpretation supporting relaxation of the "trade or
business" requirement, see Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. Department of Ind., Labor & Human
Relations, 72 Wis. 2d 26, 36-37, 240 N.W.2d 422, 428 (1976) (overruling Wisconsin's previous
judicially created requirement that the contractor be engaged in the principal employer's
"ordinary and usual business").
132. See Appendix infra, cols. I-M.
133. N.Y. Work. Comp. Law § 56 (McKinney 1965); see Appendix infra, cols. I-M.
130.
131.
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contractor has sufficient incentive to provide for the safety of his own
employees; and the loss has been properly distributed.

Edward J. Henderson
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROVISIONS
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROVISIONS
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APPENDIX (Continued)
134. The terms elective or compulsory as used herein refer solely to the obligation of the
employer. Compliance with compulsory statutes is often satisfied by participation in the state
plan, self-insurance, or private insurance. Moreover, some states permit the employee to reject
coverage and sue at common law.
135. Exemptions from obtaining insurance are often granted to employers of casual employees, domestic servants, and agricultural workers, among others. In addition, certain states
exempt employers of less than a given number of employees.

